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CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGES IN OHIO
I. IMRODUCrION
A construction mortgage may be described as the security for
a loan whose proceeds are to be used in the improvement of real
estate. Section 1311.14, Ohio Revised Code, formulates the require-
ments and codifies the effects of a construction mortgage.' The es-
sence of this section is that, in the event the requisites of the section
are met, the lien of a mortgage given to improve real estate, or to
pay off prior encumbrances thereon, and which is actually used for
such purposes, shall be prior to all mechanic's liens and similar liens
that are filed for record after the improvement mortgage is filed.
In addition, the mortgage must empower the mortgagee to per-
form all activities which are enumerated under this section of the
Code. The activities authorized by this statute include the right of
the mortgagee to pay out on the owner's order such sums as the
owner certifies to be necessary to meet and pay labor payrolls, and
to pay on the owner's order the accounts of materialmen and la-
borers who have filed notice of debt as required by this statute.
Furthermore, in the event that notice of amounts due are filed with
the mortgagee, and the owner refuses to issue an order to pay these
amounts, the mortgagee may retain the whole amount claimed until
the proper amount of such claim has been established.
A review of Ohio authorities reveals, however, that the mort-
gagee, although authorized to make disbursements in this manner,
is not required to do so. At the time the loan is transacted the mort-
gagee may pay over the entire amount loaned to the borrower, and,
if in fact the money is used in the construction project for which it
was made available, the mortgagee will retain his priority over inter-
vening lienholders. The statute provides for a blanket priority and
the priority is applicable to improvements of any nature. The court
in Knollman Lumber Co. v. Hillenbrand2 observed that the con-
struction mortgage statute clearly affords priority to construction
mortgages to the extent that the proceeds are actually used in the
improvement of the real estate regardless of the form which the im-
provement takes. The court placed a great deal of emphasis on the
fact that the statute does not limit the priority to specific improve-
ments.
An initial perusal of the statute by an individual unsophis-
1 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.14 (Page 1962).
2 64 Ohio App. 549, 29 N.E2d 61 (1940).
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ticated in the area of liens might result in his determination that
this statute was simply reiterating the common law doctrine that a
lien filed previous to another lien maintains priority over the sub-
sequently filed lien. An exploration of section 1311.13 of the Ohio
Revised Code and an examination of authorities construing this
section reveal, however, that this assumption would be erroneous.
The priority scheme with respect to mechanic's liens is established
by section 1311.13:
B) Such liens shall be preferred to all other titles, liens, or en.
cumbrances which may attach to or upon such construction,
excavation, machinery, or improvement, or to or upon the
land upon which they are situated, which shall either be
given or recorded subsequent to the commencement of said
construction, excavation, or improvement.
This section of the code reveals that once construction has been
initiated under the original contract, all mechanics liens for labor
performed and materials furnished, under the original contract or
subcontracts executed in pursuance of the original contract, are
deemed to have attached as of the date construction commenced.8
It is therefore apparent that a mechanic's lien would have priority
over another mortgage, if construction had been started by any in-
dividual before the filing of the mortgage, even though the mort-
gage was filed before the holder of the mechanic's lien had supplied
any labor or materials.
In the case of Rider v. Crobaugh4 the court refused to grant
priority to an individual who had filed his mortgage after construc-
tion had begun, but previous to the date when the lien holders with
whom he was competing had begun work or furnished materials.
The court in referring to section 8321, paragraph 12, Ohio General
Code (the predecessor of section 1311.14 of the Ohio Revised Code)
recognized that the statute did not differentiate between the me-
chanic's lienors who had performed their work at various times
during the construction. It maintained that the statute was unam-
biguous in granting priority to the several liens obtained by several
8 A Hen is created at the time construction commences, and the filing of the afl-
davit required by OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1311.06 (Page Supp. 1967) is simply the means
by which the lien is perfected. It is stated in DEMANN, OHIO MECHANIC'S LIEN LAW
§ 10.1 (2d ed. 1959):
The lien exists prior to the filing of the affidavit and the filing of the affidavit
for lien simply prevents the lien from being barred by the statutory limita-
tion.
4 100 Ohio St. 88, 125 N.E. 130 (1919).
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persons upon the same job in respect to any lien or encumbrance
recorded subsequent to the commencement of construction and that
the priority attached irrespective of whether or not the particular
work in question was performed previous to the filing of the mort-
gage.
The effect of section 1311.14 is to grant priority to the indi-
vidual who makes a construction mortgage loan, conforming with
this section, in respect to certain mechanic's lienholders. A construc-
tion lender who is conscientious in meeting the requisites of this
section is afforded priority over mechanic's lienors whose liens are
filed for record after his lien is filed. 5 Thus, although a mechanic's
lien is generally effective from the date any construction on a par-
ticular job is initiated, it does not become effective against a sec-
tion 1311.14 mortgage lendor until after this particular mechanic's
lienor has done his part of the work and has filed a mechanic's lien
in respect thereto.
H]. OBLIGATORY AND NON-OBLIGATORY LOANS DISTINGUISHED
A comprehensive examination of Ohio construction mortgage
law cannot be accomplished without a discussion of the distinction
which is recognized between mortgages securing loans that are oblig-
atory and those that secure loans that are considered non-obligatory.
A loan is obligatory to the extent that the lender has assumed a con-
tractual obligation to pay over a sum certain to the borrower. A loan
loses its obligatory nature, however, if the lender has discretion as
to whether or not the money will be advanced or if the amount to
be advanced is left to his determination.
A mortgage which secures an obligatory loan is a lien on the
property for the full amount of the loan and is effective as of the
time the mortgage is filed.
In Kuhn v. Southern Ohio Loan & Trust Co.8 the court dis-
cussed the difference between obligatory and non-obligatory future
advances. Faced with the problem of determining priorities between
a construction loan mortgagee and an intervening mortgagee, the
court ruled that the construction mortgagee was obligated to make
the advancements and because of that fact granted him priority.
They rested their holding on the ground that when a mortgagee
5 DEMANN, OHIO MECHANIC'S LIEN LAW § 10.5 (2d ed. 1959). A similar anal)sis of
the operation of § 1311.14 was made in the case of First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n.
v. Robbins, 23 Ohio Op. 110, 36 N.E.2d 991 (Ct. App. 1939).
6 101 Ohio St. 34, 126 N.E. 820 (1920).
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has bound himself to make advancements for a clearly defined pur-
pose, he immediately acquires the status of a bona fide purchaser to
the extent of the entire amount of his contractual liability, and his
position is identical to the position he would have attained if the
entire consideration had passed on the execution and delivery of the
mortgage. The lendor who has executed a mortgage obligating him-
self to make certain definite advances can be distinguished from the
individual who has made actual advances only by the almost insig-
nificant factor, that instead of having made the advances, he has
made a binding contractual promise to advance the sum at a later
date.
Conversely, a mortgage given as security for a non-obligatory
loan does not become effective until an actual advance is made and
is then effective only to the extent of payments actually advanced.
Under the Ohio approach, a loan securing optional advances is
placed subsequent in priority to a second mortgage securing present
advances which is filed, to the extent of advances not yet actually
made at the time of the filing of the second mortgage. This result
is predicated on the function of a mortgage as recognized under
Ohio law. A mortgage has validity only to the extent that it secures
a valid debt, and there is no debt until money is advanced or until
a binding contract to advance money is executed. The function of
a mortgage was commented upon by the court in the case of Spader
v. Lawler,7 where it was observed that a mortgage placed upon rec-
ord to secure all monies hereinafter advanced would undoubtedly
have no legal effect. The court reasoned that since a mortgage is a
security for the payment of money, if no valid debt was due, there
could be nothing to secure and consequently no mortgage.
The second reason for Ohio's treatment of non-obligatory ad-
vances is also based on Ohio's concept of the function of a mortgage,
that it should furnish notice to subsequent encumbrancers of the
debt which it secures.8 The purpose of requiring a public filing of
a mortgage is to provide other individuals with knowledge of the
extent to which the property is held as collateral so as to assist them
in determining whether they should make a certain loan. A mort-
gage securing advances which may or may not be made does little
to inform a subsequent mortgagee of the amount of the debt which
it secures. When a mortgage is filed which secures an indeterminate
sum, the prospective lendor's position is not much improved as com-
T 17 Ohio 371 (1848).
8 Id. at 379.
[Vol. 29
COMMENTS
pared to when he had no knowledge concerning the presence or ab-
sence of a mortgage on the property.
More recently, in the case of Second National Bank v. Boyle,9
the theory for subordinating mortgages securing non-obligatory
future advances was explained in the following language:
Obviously, where there is no obligation to make future advances,
a mortgage, purporting to secure such future advances, cannot
secure such advances until the advances have been made. Until
then, so far as such advances are concerned, there is nothing for
the mortgage to secure .... 10
There are two basic differences between obligatory and non-obliga-
tory advances to be made in the future. These differences are of such
a nature that it is logical to make a distinction in respect to when
the mortgage securing the advances is effective. The first difference
is that a subsequent mortgagee is given constructive notice that the
initial mortgagee is obligated to make a certain advance as opposed
to having an option to make an advance if he considers it advanta-
geous. Secondly, even if the obligatory mortgagee was aware of the
encumbrance intervening between the taking of the mortgage and
the advance, he could not escape his contractual obligation to make
the advance and an avoidance of this obligation would result in his
breaching his contract."
It should be observed at this juncture that Ohio's determination
that the filing of a subsequent mortgage is sufficient to afford priority
to this mortgage over a mortgage securing non-obligatory advances
has not been universally accepted. On the contrary, the majority
of jurisdictions have adopted the theory that it is necessary for the
intervening claimant to give actual notice of his mortgage to the
mortgagee who has filed a mortgage securing non-obligatory future
advances, in order to elevate his subsequently-filed mortgage to a
position of priority over later non-obligatory advances.12 The ratio-
nale which supports the majority rule is that subsequently recorded
instruments afford no notice to the recorders of previously recorded
instruments, while on the other hand, previously filed instruments
do give notice to subsequent recorders. It would be unfair and cum-
bersome to require a mortgagee, who had given record notice, to
9 155 Ohio St. 482, 99 N.E.2d 474 (1951).
10 Id. at 486, 99 N.E2d at 476.
11 Note, Obligatoy and Non-Obligatoy Advances in Ohio, 1 U. Cm,. L. Rxv.
848, 350 (1927).
12 Annot., 138 ALPR. 566, 579 (1942).
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check for subsequent encumbrances each time he advances funds.
Thus, the intervening encumbrancer can obtain priority by giving
notice to the holder of the previously recorded mortgage, which is
not burdensome and moreover follows the general pattern of notice
established by the recording statute."'
The difference between the Ohio rule and the viewpoint
adopted in the majority of jurisdictions is primarily predicated on
the categorical determination of who should bear the burden of
checking the mortgage records. Ohio and the other jurisdictions
which operate under the same theory assert that it is illogical to
demand that an intervening mortgagee give notice to the mortgagee
whose mortgage is for non-obligatory future advances due to the
fact that the non-obligatory mortgage does not secure a valid debt.
In Ladue v. Detroit & M. R.R.,14 the court stated that the majority
rule
rests upon the erroneous idea that the recording of a mortgage
adds something to its validity as between the parties, and that,
even as between them, an instrument may be made a mortgage
by recording it, which would not have had that operation withl-
out the record.' 5
On the other hand, the jurisdictions which have promulgated
the majority rule assert that the subsequent filing of a mortgage
should not be considered sufficient to constitute notice to the non-
obligatory mortgagee. Those jurisdictions assert that the recording
of an intervening lien gives notice to subsequent claimants only
and does not give notice to prior mortgagees of record.10 Addition-
ally, the proponents of the majority rule reason that a claimant
filing subsequent to the future advance mortgage has notice of the
possibility of these advances. 7
13 Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383, 19 P. 641 (1888); Oaks v. Wcingartner, 105
Cal. App. 2d 598, 234 P.2d 194 (1951); Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 85 N.Y. 43 (1881).
14 13 Mich. 380 (1865).
15 Id. at 400.
10 Note, The Open-End Mortgage in Ohio, 25 U. CIN. L. Rav. 82, 88 (1956).
17 Legal Bull., September, 1953, p. 78 et seq., published by the United States
Savings and Loan League, Chicago, Ill. (This article presents a complete survey of the
law in forty-eight of the fifty states (Alaska and Hawaii being omitted); Illinois,
Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania are listed as following the minority or "Michigan"
rule under which intervening lienors take priority over subsequent advances made
under a non-obligatory loan).
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III. THE EFFECT OF OHIO'S OPEN END LEGISLATION
It is pertinent that the application of the minority approach
has been diminished to a large degree by a recent Ohio statutory
enactment. This statute is commonly designated as the "open-end
mortgage statute."' 8 Basically this provision adopts the above-men-
tioned majority rule under circumstances where the requirements
of the statute are met. In effect, this statute states that a mortgage
may secure unpaid balances of loans made after the mortgage is re-
corded, if it contains the words "open-end mortgage" at the begin-
ning of the instrument, and the maximum amount of unpaid loan
indebtedness. In addition, the mortgage must also state that the
parties intend that the mortgage shall secure the above-mentioned
amount. However, the statute continues by providing that if an
amount is advanced after the mortgagee receives written notice of
a lien or encumbrance on the mortgaged premises, which is sub-
ordinate to his mortgage, and he is not obligated to make the ad-
vancement at that time, the lien of the mortgage for the unpaid
balance of the advance so made shall be subordinate to such lien
or encumbrance. The lien of a mortgage for the unpaid balance of
the advance is also subordinate to a valid mechanic's lien to the
extent that the mortgagee received notice that the work was per-
formed or to be performed or machinery, material, or fuel was fur-
nished or to be furnished, in respect to any advance the mortgagee
was not obligated to make at the time he receives such notice.
The impact of this statute is that all advances made under a
non-obligatory loan effectively attach at the time of the filing of the
mortgage which secures them. The priority of the mortgage secur-
ing these advances is subject only to subordination in situations
where the advance was made after actual notice of a subordinate or
mechanic's lien was received.
IV. THE YARBOROUGH CASE
The present state of Ohio law in the area of construction mort-
gages is governed to a large degree by the Ohio Supreme Court's
recent decision in the case of Wayne Building & Loan Co. v. Yar-
borough.19 The dominant influence this case will exert on the con-
struction mortgage field in Ohio necessitates a detailed considera-
tion of the legal questions which were present in that case and of the
is Omio REv. CoDE ANN. § 5301232 (Page Supp. 1967).
19 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 228 NXE.2d 841 (1967). See also Waenc Bldg. & Loan Co.
v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d 224, 228 N.E.2d 860 (1967). This case was a com-
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manner in which they were resolved by Ohio's highest court. A
familiarity with the facts of Yarborough is instrumental in gaining
a thorough understanding of the court's decision.
On August 28, 1963, Mr. Yarborough, a builder, executed an
agreement with a Mr. and Mrs. Lantz whereby the Lantzes were
to purchase certain real estate in Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, upon Mr.
Yarborough's completion of construction of a house upon that real
estate. A cognovit note for 18,000 dollars was given to Yarborough
by the Lantzes on August 28, but the only cash paid out to Yar-
borough by the Lantzes was in two four thousand dollar payments,
the first on October 11, 1963, and the second on March 10, 1964,
On October 16, 1963, Yarborough notified Sauter Development
Company of the contract of sale with the Lantzes. Sauter deeded
the above-mentioned real estate to Yarborough on this date. Yar-
borough paid one thousand dollars cash and executed a note for
four thousand six hundred dollars, Sauter retaining a mortgage as
security for the note.
Also on October 16, Yarborough applied to the Wayne Build-
ing and Loan Company for a 22,000 dollar construction loan on
the lot and proposed house. Wayne received a mortgage as security
and it was informed of the prior sale of the residential property
and approved the plans for the house. On November 1, Wayne re-
corded its mortgage.
On November 21, construction was commenced on the resi-
dence, with Sauter filing its mortgage on December 11. Later that
same day it filed the warranty deed for the lot which it had sold
to Yarborough. Immediately subsequent to the filing of the deed,
Wayne filed its mortgage, probably with the realization that when
it initially filed on November 1, Yarborough was not the owner of
record. Apparently due to Yarborough's financial difficulties, the
house was not completed. The basic problem which the court en-
panion case to the first mentioned case of the same name, and the court's reasoning
was almost identical. The facts were substantially the same as those present in the
first Yarborough case with the exceptions that Eaton & Co. were the developers,
and there was no individual involved who possessed a vendee's equitable lien. Addl-
tionally, Wayne's mortgage was filed before Eaton's, and both were filed prior to the
commencement of the construction on the residence. However, since Wayne had made
no actual disbursements before Eaton's mortgage was filed, they were positioned
lower in priority. Furthermore, since Wayne's disbursements were not obligatory and
did not follow the procedure required by Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.14 (Page 1962),
or were not shown to have actually been used in the construction, they were sub.
ordinated to the mechanic's liens. Akron Say. & L. Co. v. Ronson Home, Inc., 15 Ohio
St. 2d 6, 238 N.E.2d 760 (1968) reaffirmed the court's holding in Yarborough.
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countered was determining the relative priority of the liens on the
property which were possessed by the Lantzes, various materialmen,
Sauter, and Wayne. Both the Court of Common Pleas and the Court
of Appeals of Summit County found the following priorities among
these claimants: (1) Wayne's construction mortgage lien; (2) me-
chanic's liens; (3) Sauter's mortgage lien. Reversing the decision of
the lower courts, the Ohio Supreme Court first considered the
Lantzes' equitable vendee's lien. They stated a generally recognized
rule that a vendee's equitable lien arises as security to the vendee
to the extent of the amount he pays out. Additionally, although
Wayne alleged to have had no knowledge of the Lantzes' lien,
knowledge was imputed to it since it knew that the lot was sold.
The court held that it was incumbent upon them to investigate
the interest which was held by the purchaser of the real estate. Pri-
ority was afforded to both of the Lantzes' four thousand dollar pay-
ments over Wayne and Sauter, although the Lantzes' second payment
on March 10, 1964, was subsequent to the filing of both Wayne and
Sauter's liens. The court held that the filing of these mortgages did
not constitute notice to the Lantzes, and only actual notice on the
part of the Lantzes concerning Wayne's and Sauter's mortgages
would bestow priority to these mortgages.
In upholding the preference which section 1311.18 of the Ohio
Revised Code grants to mechanic's liens, the court allowed priority
to the four thousand dollar payment of the Lantzes made previous
to the commencement of construction, but placed the mechanic's
lien holders ahead of the Lantzes in respect to the second four thou-
sand dollar payment which was made subsequent to the start of
construction.2 0
Sauter's lien was placed subordinate to the mechanic's lien as
it was filed after construction was initiated. Furthermore, Sauter was
20 Chief Justice Taft, concurring, was reluctant to accept the majority's ruling
that the Lantzes should be afforded priority over the mechanic lienholders, to the
extent of payments by the Lantzes previous to the commencement of construction.
His caution was predicated on the fact that the mechanic lienholders did not have
notice of the Lantzes' lien and there is no precedent for subordinating a mechanic
lienholder in this situation. In addition, he was apprehensive of establishing this
priority under this fact situation. His viewpoint was based on the observation that
enough money was realized from the sale of the real estate and partially completed
residence to pay both the Lantzes and the mechanic lienholders the entire amounts
owed to them. As a result, neither side had presented significant arguments as to
whether they should be afforded priority. The question of priority between these two
claimants was not really in issue as both parties dearly would be paid in full no
matter how the priority scheme between them was resolved. Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co.
v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 222, 228 N.E2.d 841, 859 (1967).
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positioned above Wayne on the rationale that, although Wayne's
mortgage was filed sooner, Wayne did not make the disbursements
until after December 11. Therefore, Wayne's recorded mortgage did
not secure a lien until advances were actually made. Conversely,
Sauter had given value before his mortgage was filed, that is, when
he forwarded the deed to the property, so his lien was given priority.
Wayne argued that its mortgage was a construction mortgage
and that according to section 1311.14 of the Ohio Revised Code, it
should be allowed priority over mechanic's liens filed for record after
the construction mortgage was filed for record. The court said, how-
ever, that the advances which Wayne made were not obligatory. It
explained that Wayne was not required by its mortgage loan to make
payments of specific amounts to certain people at definite times, but
rather was to pay out up to a maximum of 22,000 dollars in the man-
ner and at times it felt was proper. The court continued by stating
that where payments are not obligatory and, absent the establish-
ment of compliance with the disbursement requirements as desig-
nated by section 1311.14 of the Ohio Revised Code, or proof that the
advances made were actually used in the construction for which the
liens were given, mortgages contemplating future advances are sub-
sequent in priority to mechanic's liens arising from the construction.
The result reached by the court in Yarborough can be ex-
plained on the grounds that it is a judicial solution to a problem
created by a certain practice which has gained popularity in the con-
struction industry. A contractor presents his plans for the construc-
tion of a house to a lending institution and negotiates a construction
loan which is secured by a mortgage on the proposed building and
the property which is to be the site of the building. After receiving
the money, instead of applying it to the construction for which the
advance was made, he utilizes the money to meet past obligations
which are due from other transactions in which he was a participant.
If the contractor continues to be financially successful, he completes
the construction when other obligations owing to him are met. The
difficulty arises, however, in situations where the contractor has over-
extended himself and is not capable of completing the construction
for which the loan was given. A sale of the uncompleted structure
is necessary, and the proceeds of this sale are not sufficient both to
compensate the laborers and materialmen and repay the loan to the
construction lender. The decision in Yarborough is directly respon-
sive to the question of who should be given preference in these cir-
cumstances, with the court indicating that it is incumbent upon the
[Vol. 29
COMMENTS
construction lender to insure that the loan proceeds are applied to
the construction.
This burden is placed on the mortgage lender because he is in
control of the money and his close scrutiny of its disbursement will
result in completion of the construction. If the construction is com-
pleted, the problem of lien priority will be nonexistent. This con-
viction of the court is well illustrated by the following excerpt from
its opinion:
If his estimate of the value of the improvement is accurate, and
he sees to it that the money advanced is actually used in the con-
struction of the improvement, the mechanics and the material-
men will be paid; there will be no valid mechanics' liens; the
value of the security will be enhanced; and the mortgagee can
get back the money he advanced upon foreclosure and sale of
the security, if that is necessary, without the necessity of being
held prior to mechanics' lienors. Since the mortgagee has the op-
tion of advancing or not advancing, and he may by due dili-
gence insure that the money advanced inures to the benefit of
his security before he advances, it is only just that he should
bear the burden of any loss which he could have prevented, in
contrast to a mechanic's lienor who has enhanced the value of
the mortgagee's security by his labor or goods and who exercises
the diligence which the law requires from him and pursues his
only remedy by following the statutory procedure to obtain his
lien. 21
Even if one is convinced that the holding in Yarborough brings
about an equitable result, it must be recognized that the court en-
gaged in an unnecessary disregard of precedent.
A review of the decision reveals that the requirements for meet-
ing the test of "obligatory" have been significantly magnified. In
Kuhn v. Southern Ohio Loan & Trust Co.,22 the court ruled that
the loan in question was obligatory. Their decision was grounded
on the inclusion of the following statutory covenant quoted from
the loan agreement:
"This mortgage is given to improve the premises described
herein, to pay off prior incumbrances thereon and the mortgagor
hereby consents and agrees with the mortgagee that the funds
secured by this mortgage may be paid out by the mortgagee as
provided in Section 8321-1 [now section 1311.14 Ohio Revised
Code] of the General Code Ohio."23
21 Id. at 218, 228 N.E2d at 857.
22 101 Ohio St. 34, 126 N.E. 820 (1920).
23 Id. at 34, 126 N.E. at 820.
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The court reasoned as follows:
In the present case the record does not disclose an obliga-
tion in terms on the part of the mortgagee to advance to the
mortgagor the amount specified in the instrument. However, the
purpose of the loan as stated in the mortgage itself was "to im.
prove the premises described [and] to pay off prior incum-
brances thereon," and it is expressly agreed between the parties
that "the funds secured by this mortgage may be paid out by
the mortgagee as provided in Section 8321-1 of the General Code
of Ohio," this is to say, to mechanics and materialmen. Under
these stipulations, and in the absence of other evidence, an
inference of fact arises that the mortgagee obligated itself for
the purposes and in the amount stipulated. 24
Clearly, the inclusion of the statutory covenant, which was held suf-
ficient to constitute an obligation in Kuhn, is no longer an adequate
safeguard that may be employed to insure that the loan will be con-
sidered obligatory. Now the requirement is the presence of an exist-
ing obligation at the time the mortgage is executed to pay certain
sums upon certain conditions. While not expressly overruling Kuhn,
the decision in Yarborough indicated the existence of "other evi-
dence" which was sufficient to outweigh the "inference of fact" aris-
ing from the inclusion in the mortgage of the statutory covenant.
As there will always be "other evidence" which can be used to coun-
terbalance the "inference of fact," it is evident that the requirements
of an obligatory loan have actually been significantly increased.
Even though the construction loan in Yarborough arose before
construction commenced, the court displayed no reluctance in ap-
plying section 1311.14. The application of the statute under these
circumstances is in direct conflict with the unanimous position of
a continuous line of cases. These cases have held that this statute does
not apply to loans executed previous to the commencement of con-
struction. As recently as 1961, it was held that this statute's scope
was limited to the extent that it protected only lenders who make
construction loans after construction on the property had com-
menced. In A. G. Sharp Lumber Co. v. Manus Homes, Inc.25 the
court was confronted with the problem of whether this statutory
provision was applicable to a construction loan and the mortgage
securing it when the loan was made previous to the beginning of
construction. The court ruled in no uncertain terms that section
1311.14 was not concerned with the priority of a mortgage filed for
24 Id. at 38, 126 N.E. at 821-822.
25 90 Ohio L. Abs. 421, 189 N.E.2d 447 (Ct. App. 1961).
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record before construction has started and consequently has no bear-
ing on this type of mortgage.
This court's interpretation of the statute appears correct upon
considering the purpose for which this legislation was adopted. The
court in Rider v. Crobaugh2 explained the impetus behind the pas-
sage of section 1311.14 by examining the priority status of construc-
tion mortgages prior to its enactment. In 1913 the Ohio legislature
adopted a statute which provided that the liens obtained by various
individuals on the same job should be preferred to a mortgage re-
corded subsequent to the commencement of the construction. There-
fore a construction mortgage lender who made a loan subsequent
to when the first work was done would be junior to all mechanic
lienors who ultimately provided labor or materials for the job. Nat-
urally construction lenders were reluctant to make a loan when con-
fronted with this highly unfavorable priority scheme and as a result,
if a contractor's financial resources were inadequate to meet the needs
of the construction project, the building operations were stopped
entirely. Two years later, in order to combat this problem the legis-
lature passed section 8321-1 General Code (now section 1311.14 of
the Ohio Revised Code). It is therefore apparent that the legislative
motivation behind the enactment of section 1311.14 was the desire
to encourage mortgage lenders to make loans of this nature in order
that construction could be completed. As a result, all parties having
an interest in the property would receive a larger share of that to
which they were entitled.
The view adopted in A. G. Sharp Lumber Co. is also buttressed
by the fact that the statute serves no function in respect to construc-
tion loan mortgages filed previous to the commencement of construc-
tion. Even previous to the adoption of this statutory provision, a
construction mortgage filed before any construction had begun was
afforded priority to subsequently filed mechanic's liens.
In refusing to afford priority to Wayne's mortgage, which was
found to be non-obligatory, the court adopted an approach that is
unique when contrasted to the rationale utilized in analogous cases.
The Yarborough court's reasons for favoring constructive notice ap-
parently do not derive from analysis of the proper functioning of
the recording system. While the court first holds the Wayne mort-
gage is properly recorded, it then states that the question is whether
26 100 Ohio St. 88, 125 N._. 130 (1919).
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such prior recordation entitles the Wayne mortgage to priority.27
This is the same question posed by Ladue28 and, to some extent,
Spader.29 Instead of discussing the effect of recordation, the Yar-
borough decision discussed the result of giving effect to recordation.
The court, primarily concerned with reaching an equitable result,
reasons that no loss would have resulted to either of the parties if
the funds had been disbursed in accordance with section 1311.14 or
had been actually used in the construction. If such procedure was
followed, the construction mortgagee would not need to be prior
to the intervening mechanic's lienors to preserve his security, because
the mechanics and materialmen would have been paid from the loan
proceeds.3 0
When the court discusses notice, it has already arrived at a solu-
tion to the problem of what effect to give to the construction mort-
gagee's prior recordation. Two reasons are given for retaining Ohio's
rule charging the holder of a mortgage contemplating future ad-
vances with constructive notice of intervening encumbrances. First,
the constructive notice given by the reasonably apparent commence-
ment of construction a relatively objective test, similar to record
notice, when compared with the subjective determination of the
mortgagee's actual knowledge. Second, if the mortgagee is under a
duty of diligence to see that the loan proceeds are disbursed in ac-
cordance with section 1311.14 or actually used in construction,
knowledge of the commencement of construction is imperative to
the discharge of such duty.31
If the court had adopted the majority rule requiring actual
notice, the mortgagee, who has no actual notice of the intervening
mechanic's lien, could make discretionary advances to the mortgagor.
This would result in mechanic's lienors bearing the entire loss if the
fund were not used in the construction or disbursed in accordance
with section 1311.14. The court argued that the mechanic's lienors,
who followed their only remedy by perfecting their liens under
section 1311.13, should be accorded priority. But the construction
mortgagee could have avoided this result by contracting to make
27 Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 213, 228 N.E.2d
841, 854 (1967).
28 Ladue v. Detroit and Milwaukee R. R. Co., 13 Mich. 380 (1965).
29 Spader v. Lawler, 17 Ohio 371 (1848).
30 Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 218, 228 N.E.2d
841, 857 (1967).
31 Id. at 219-220, 228 N.E.2d at 858.
[Vol. 29
COMMENTS
obligatory advances or by disbursing the loan proceeds in accordance
with section 1311.14. Both alternatives available to the construction
mortgagee would have given him adequate security for his loan.32
Therefore, it is evident that the majority and minority rationales
consider notice in different contexts.P The Yarborough decision
predicates its discussion of notice upon the availability to the lien
claimants of alternative methods of protecting their security. This
reasoning led the court to the equitable selection of a construction
mortgagee as a better lien claimant to bear the loss. The court's
resolution appears to coerce the construction mortgagee, whose
mortgage secures optional advances, to disburse the loan proceeds in
accordance with section 1311.14 or to see that they are actually used
in the construction. The construction mortgagee can avoid this duty
by entering into a contractual agreement with the mortgagor obli-
gating himself to advance definite sums under certain conditions.3 4
The court's construction of section 1311.14 appears to be in conflict
with the ruling in Rider v. Crobaugh35 that a construction mortgage
filed before construction began does not obligate the mortgagee to
disburse advances in accordance with section 1311.14. The construc-
tion mortgage considered in Rider did not contain the statutory
covenant.38 It is possible to argue that the inclusion of the covenant
in the mortgage is a contractual assumption 37 of the duty to disburse
in accordance with section 1311.14. However, several Ohio lower
court decisions, without extensive discussion, have held a construc-
tion mortgage including the statutory covenant superior to a subse-
quent mechanic's lien on the authority of Rider.3 8
The court could have disposed of the construction mortgagee's
claim for priority without going into a discussion of the detrimental
effect which the granting of such priority would have on mechanic's
lien holders. By simply utilizing its past decisions, which espoused
32 Id. at 218, 228 N.E.2d at 857.
33 Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383, 19 P. 641 (1888); see Note, The Open.End
Mortgage in Ohio, 25 U. CN. L. Ray. 82, 83 (1956).
34 Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 200, 228 N.E.2d
841, 858 (1967).
35 100 Ohio St. 88, 125 N.E. 130 (1919).
36 Id. at 89, 125 N.E. at 131. The statutory covenant which is referred to is the
same covenant which was the basis on which the advance was held obligatory in
Kuhn v. Southern Ohio Loan & Trust Co., 101 Ohio St. 34, 126 N.E. 820 (1920).
37 In re Williams, 252 F. 924, 930 (NJ). Ohio 1918).
38 Commerce-Guardian Bank v. Catawba Cliffs Beach Club, 54 Ohio App. 437, 7
N.E.2d 830 (1936); Becker v. Wilson, 30 Ohio App. 340, 165 N.E. 108 (1929). See also
In re Taylor, 20 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1927).
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a doctrine that prior recordation of a mortgage securing non-obliga-
tory advances was not effective against subsequent mortgages, the
court could have avoided the creation of a theory of priority which
depends on a consideration of the various manners in which the com-
peting mortgagees could have secured their loans. The facts in
Yarborough could have been considered as consisting of two prob-
lems: The first problem is the effect to be given to the prior recorda-
tion of a mortgage securing non-obligatory advances. The theory that
the mortgage secures a debt of Spader and Boyle when applied to
the facts of Yarborough results in the attaching of the mechanic's
liens before the lien of the construction mortgage. The second prob-
lem is the relative priority of the lien claimants in a situation where
the construction mortgagee claims he has qualified under section
1311.14. The court could have ruled that section 1311.14 would not
apply because the construction mortgage was not effectively filed for
record previous to the filing of the mechanic's lien. This decision
could have been predicated on the court's construction of section
1311.14 as designating that construction mortgages contemplating
optional future advances do not take effect as a valid lien on the
premises until such advances are made on the faith of the mortgage.
This approach seems preferable to the one adopted. By empha-
sizing the importance of obtaining an equitable distribution of the
loss occasioned by the mortgagor's default, the court failed ade-
quately to integrate precedent in its ratio decidendi. The decision,
which seems just and equitable, could have been derived more
explicitly from the rationale of Spader, Kuhn and Boyle. The court,
however, chose to discuss alternative methods available to the con-
struction mortgagee to secure his loan. Logically the availability of
these alternatives or the purpose for which the loan proceeds are
used should not be determinative of the effect which should be given
to recordation. However, under the present law these considerations
are determinative of the question of priorities between mechanic's
lienors and the subsequently recorded construction mortgage under
section 1311.14 in Ohio.
V. THE PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE YARBOROUGH DECISION
Although legal academicians are doubtlessly amused by the
exercise of pointing out the logical fallacies in the court's opinion,
this activity has limited value. The remainder of this article will
consider some questions concerning construction mortgages which
have not yet been litigated, followed by a consideration of the safe-
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guards which should be utilized by construction lenders in the
future.
The court's holding in Yarborough assures a mortgagee of top
priority if his advances are actually used in the improvement of the
property.39 A problem of great practical consideration which remains
unanswered, however, is whether a narrow or broad connotation will
be applied to the clause "used in the improvement." In light of the
court's ruling that section 1311.14 encompasses construction loans
executed previous to the commencement of construction, it is evi-
dent that the proceeds of the loan will be used to meet expenditures
whose characteristics are of such a nature that it is questionable
whether or not they are "used in the improvement." Architects' fees,
which necessarily arise from the planning and formulating of blue-
prints of the proposed building, and surveyors' fees, which are
charged for the determination of the property boundaries, are two
examples of these questionable expenditures. Both of these items,
although not strictly part of the construction itself, are necessary
prerequisites to the initiation of construction. A determining factor
in the future judicial interpretations of the scope of the clause "used
in the improvement" will be a consideration of the purpose for
which the statute was enacted. As previously discussed 40 courts have
generally accepted the proposition that the intent of the legislature
was to provide a mechanism which would stimulate lenders to make
loans in situations where the construction could not be completed
unless additional working capital was obtained. The courts' hold-
ings have generally reflected the preferential treatment which the
legislature designated for this type of lender. Any prophecy concern-
ing whether the courts will develop a favorable attitude towards
construction loans made previous to the beginning of construction
would be purely conjectural. It appears logical, however, that if
these loans are to be encouraged, the interpretation of the clause
"used in the improvement" will be broad enough to encompass
architects' fees, surveyors' fees and other similar expenses. The
mortgage lender realizes that a survey of the land and the utilization
of an architect are required to construct a building. He is therefore
cognizant of the fact that some of the money which he loans will be
used for that purpose. If the lender is not given priority in respect
to these expenditures, the likelihood of his making a loan is lessened.
39 Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 219, 228 N.E2d
841, 857 (1967).
40 Se notes 0-31, supra and accompanying tent.
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From a practical standpoint, it also seems consistent with the
theory of priorities to treat these expenses as though they were "used
in the improvement." The value of the property is enhanced by
these expenditures and therefore the mechanic's lienholder is not
damaged by the granting of priority in respect to these expenses.
This situation can be contrasted to the circumstance where a mort-
gagee gives money to the borrower and obtains a priority to the
extent of the amount paid, and the borrower does not utilize the
money for the construction. The impetus behind the demand that
the money be "used in the improvement" is to avoid placing the
mechanic's lienholder in an inferior position by granting priority
to a mortgagee when in fact the money he advanced did not increase
the value of the construction property.41
A question of similar import is whether priority will be granted
to the lender for the discount or service fee which he charges for
making the loan. In conjunction with the above discussion, it does
not seem improbable that a lender would be reluctant to make a loan
if he is denied priority as to his profits on the transaction. One might
argue, therefore, that in order to motivate lenders to make these
loans, courts ought to extend the priority to the percentage of the
loan which the mortgage lender retains as the cost for making the
loan. But unlike architect's and surveyors' fees, the problem of the
lender's profits is not a question of first impression. The court in
Burrer v. Keystone Construction & Loan Co.,4 2 when considering
whether priority should be granted to the lender on the percentage
of the loan which he designated profit, remarked that they found no
statutory authority for the payment of the lender's costs out of the
funds made available under a section 8321-1 General Code (the
predecessor of section 1311.14 Ohio Revised Code) loan. The perti-
nent statutory provision reads as follows:
Such mortgage is a lien on the premises therein described from
the time it is filed for record for the full amount that is ulti-
mately and actually paid out under said mortgage, regardless of
the time when the money secured thereby is advanced.43
Similarly in Simpson v. Lewis4 4 the lender deducted five percent
from the mortgage loan, retaining such amount as a service charge.
41 Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 218, 228 N.E,2d
841, 857-58 (1967).
42 19 Ohio L. Abs. 393 (Ct. App. 1935).
43 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1811.14 (Page 1962).
44 23 Ohio L. Rep. 297 (C. P. 1925).
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The court refused to grant priority due to the fact that the five per-
cent was not "actually paid out under such mortgage." The rationale
for the position that the lender should not be granted priority is
basically statutory. The fact that the money actually never leaves the
hands of the lender is fatal.
This problem could conceivably be avoided by careful manip-
ulation of the loan funds. The mortgagee could pay the amount of
the service charge out of the mortgage fund to the borrower. Subse-
quently, the borrower could pay an identical amount back to the
lender. But courts will probably recognize that this is only a mean-
ingless exchange of the funds, and it is dubious that they will con-
sider this as satisfying the requirement of "paying out" the funds.
Furthermore, courts may hold the money was not "used in the im-
provement" of the property, even though it is clear that the obtain-
ing of a loan is in furtherance of the construction.
The transactions in Yarborough arose in 1963, and thus prior to
the adoption of any open-end mortgage legislation in Ohio. Clearly,
the open-end mortgage can be utilized to effect a transformation in
the scheme of priorities which existed previous to the adoption of
the open-end mortgage statute.45 Before the enactment of this statute,
a mortgagee making non-obligatory advances occupied a perilous
position. Regardless of when his mortgage was filed, it was not a lien
on the premises until an advance was made and even then it was
only a lien to the extent of the payments actually made. Thus if
construction was commenced before the mortgagee made any ad-
vances, all the individuals entitled to mechanic's liens on the premises
would be senior to the mortgage lender as their liens are deemed to
have attached at the time construction was initiated. Furthermore,
even if he had made advances before the beginning of construction,
any advances made subsequent to this date would be subsequent in
priority to the mechanic's liens. Under the new open-end mortgage
act, the priority scale is different. If the formal requisites of the
open-end mortgage are met, a mortgage for non-obligatory future
advances becomes a lien on the premises as of the date the mortgage
is recorded. A subsequent mortgagee or a mechanic's lienholder can
gain priority only by serving actual notice of their liens on the non-
obligatory mortgagee. A mortgage lien is subordinate to these liens
only to the extent that he is not obligated to make advances at the
time he receives such notice. The-major effect of this statute is to
postpone the time at which a lien becomes effective against a non-
45 ORio REv. CODE.ANN. § 5301.232 (Page Supp. 1967).
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obligatory mortgagee who has met the requirements of the open-end
mortgage statute. Under this system, instead of the mechanic's liens
attaching as of the date construction commences, they do not attach
until the non-obligatory mortgagee gets actual notice of their exis-
tence. Likewise, other subordinate liens are not effective as of the
date they are filed; rather, they acquire priority only to the extent
that non-obligatory advances are made by the mortgagee after he
receives actual notice of these liens.
However, the significance of this statute in respect to the con-
struction mortgage should not be over-emphasized. Practical con-
siderations lead one to doubt the sagacity of lending under a non-
obligatory open-end mortgage. Although the mortgage will be
afforded priority to the extent of advances made prior to the receipt
of actual notice of subsequent liens, when construction is involved
notices of work and labor to be performed and materials to be fur-
nished will be forthcoming in the near future.
VI. ALTERNATIVE METHODS BY WHICH PRIORITY CAN BE
ACCOMPLISHED
There are several procedures which a prospective construction
mortgage lender should employ to insure that his mortgage will
maintain superiority.
A. The Equitable Vendee Lien Problem
The first caveat is that Yarborough decided that an individual
possessing an equitable vendee's lien will be granted priority over a
construction mortgagee who knows that the borrower has entered
into a contract for the sale of the real estate. The priority extends to
all payments made by the vendee prior to the time when he obtains
actual notice of the construction lender's mortgage. This priority
problem can be alleviated by including a clause in the construction
mortgage to the effect that the borrower states he has not entered
into a contract for the sale of the real estate and he will not negotiate
such a contract without notifying the construction lender. Addi-
tionally, this clause should require that the notice of the prospective
contract of sale will contain the name and address of the future
purchaser. This clause will insure that the lender will not be pre-
sumed to have had knowledge of the contract for the sale of the
real estate. Furthermore, since the borrower is bound to notify the
lender before the execution of any contract for the sale of the real
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estate, an opportunity will be afforded to the lender to give actual
notice of his mortgage to the prospective purchaser. It should be
noted, however, that in a great many cases a construction lender will
not find it desirable to obtain a statement from the borrower that
the borrower has not sold the property. On the contrary, many
lenders require that the borrower have a buyer before they will
negotiate the loan. This is due to their belief that only when the
borrower has sold the real estate are they adequately assured the loan
will be repaid. This belief is predicated on the fact that a certain
number of contractors and builders build a large number of houses
and then encounter difficulty in selling them. Their creditors be-
come impatient and the houses are sold at foreclosure sales. This
action results in the houses bringing an extremely low price, and
consequently, the lender as well as other creditors receive only
partial recompense. There is an alternative solution to the problem
of vendee's liens when the lender prefers to lend only if the borrower
has sold the real estate. The lender should inform the borrower
that he will make loans only if the borrower has included in his
contract to sell the real estate a clause stating that the purchaser is
cognizant of the fact that a construction loan will be necessary for
completion of the residence, and that he agrees that his equitable
vendee's lien shall be subordinated to the mortgage which secures
the construction loan.
In order to obtain priority over mechanic's lienholders, it
appears there are three alternatives available to the construction
lender: (1) clearly emphasize in the loan agreement that the ad-
vances are obligatory, or (2) establish that the advances were actually
used in the construction for which the liens are claimed, or (3) dem-
onstrate that the advances were disbursed in conformity with the
provisions of section 1311.14.
B. Obligatory Advances
The obligatory nature of a loan can be emphatically established
by the utilization in the loan agreement of words which indicate the
assumption of a binding contractual obligation to make definite
payments of sums certain at specific times. Careful draftsmanship
should be practiced to insure that the instrument does not contain
language which could be interpreted as granting discretion to the
lender concerning the amounts to be advanced. The incorporation of
a disbursement schedule into the loan agreement would be a wise
precautionary measure. This schedule should state the amounts that
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will be advanced at various structural stages as the construction
progresses.46
A thorough discussion of obligatory advances necessitates the
recognition of a distinction that is not clear from the opinion as
expressed in the Yarborough decision; a distinction which if over-
looked would prove fatal to the construction mortgage lender. A
lender who makes his construction loan advances obligatory secures
a position equivalent to the mortgagee whose advances are actually
used in construction or who disburses in accordance with section
1311.14 only under circumstances where the mortgage securing the
construction loan is filed previous to the commencement of con-
struction. Due to the fact that all mechanic's liens attach at the time
construction begins, except with respect to mortgagees who qualify
under section 1311.14, even a mortgagee whose advances are obliga-
tory is subordinate to these liens if he does not satisfy the require-
ments of section 1311.14. It is therefore clear that the three alterna-
tives as set forth in Yarborough are only equivalent alternatives
under the Yarborough fact pattern, i.e., when the mortgage is re-
corded preceding the commencement of construction.
C. Advances Actually Used in the Improvement
The priority afforded to the mortgagee for advances made which
were actually used in the construction should not be relied on to any
large degree. Although this priority may be advantageous when
the question of priority is examined in retrospect, there is in reality
no way of policing the activities of the borrower to insure that the
advances are employed in the furtherance of the designated con-
struction. There is no method by which one can prevent the bor-
rower from using the money for other purposes if it is paid directly
to him. Therefore, although this priority should be argued in litiga-
tion there is no systematized procedure that can be integrated into a
comprehensive planning pattern which can assure the lender in ad-
vance that the amounts paid will be used in the construction and
the accompanying priority received.
D. Disbursements Pursuant to Section 1311.14
The third alternative which can be employed to obtain priority
is for the lender to make disbursements in conformity with section
1311.14. As previously mentioned, this section authorizes a lender to
withhold payments from the mortgage loan, which are sufficient to
46 See Akron Say. & L. Co. v. Ronson Homes, Inc., 15 01o St. 2d 6, 13, 238 N.Ed
706 (1968).
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cover any notices, which the lender receives, of labor or materials
furnished or to be furnished. Under this alternative, the lender has
a relatively simple task of informing the borrower that certain
amounts will not be advanced until the borrower has ordered that
these laborers and materialmen be paid. Requirements of this dis-
bursement section can be met without difficulty, but it is obvious
that the lender's maintenance of records of laborers and materialmen
becomes a job of major importance.47
Irrespective of the mortgage lender's diligence in meeting the
requirements of the above alternatives, it is important to note that
if his mortgage is filed after the construction commences, it will only
be superior to those laborers and materialmen who have not partici-
pated in the construction as of that date. For this reason, the lender
should take measures to insure that these individuals situated above
him in the priority hierarchy are satisfied. This goal could be
achieved by making provisions in the loan agreement to pay off these
prior encumbrances, or more simply by the lender retaining amounts
sufficient to cover these liens from the mortgage fund. As an addi-
tional alternative the lender could negotiate with these mechanic's
lienors and reach an agreement with them that their liens would be
subordinate to his. Although these prior lienors would be reluctant
to relinquish their priority, the lender occupies a strong bargaining
position if his loan is necessary to complete the construction.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Yarborough decision has already exerted a considerable
influence on the construction lending industry and promises to
continue as a dominant concern to construction lenders in the
future. Although Yarborough does not present a crystal clear answer
to several of the problems, and will necessarily be subject to buffer-
ing by subsequent cases, certain principles do emerge from the deci-
sion.
47 It is significant to note that the standard practice in the construction lending
industry is to include a loan disbursement agreement in the mortgage instrument. The
court in Yarborough, in the course of examining the obligatory or non.obligatory
nature of Wayne's advances, appeared to attach considerable weight to the absence of
any such schedule in the transaction that was under scrutiny.
It was specifically found by the Court of Appeals that there was no agreement
between the Yarboroughs and Wayne that was not contained in the mortgage,
note, assignment of funds, or agreement with respect to mechanics liens, and
perhaps the loan application. While these reveal that the purpose of the ad-
vances was to construct a house, they reveal no obligation on the part of
Wayne to advance a certain sum, under particular conditions, for this purpose.
11 Ohio St. 2d at 221, 228 N.E.2d at 858.
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Initially, it is evident, at least at this time, that section 1311.14
of the Ohio Revised Code is applicable to construction mortgage
loans filed prior to the commencement of construction in addition
to situations where some work has been performed before the con-
struction mortgage was filed. Irrespective of the presence of an
abundance of cases reaching a contrary result and even though the
legislature did not appear to intend to include within the scope of
the statute lenders who filed their mortgages before the start of con-
struction, Yarborough expressly ruled that these lenders are encom-
passed by the statute.
The Yarborough decision also establishes that a prospective con-
struction lender has three methods by which he can preserve priority
for his mortgage. He may make his advances obligatory, police the
money paid out to make sure that it is actually used in the construc-
tion or make the advances in conformance with the disbursement
requirements of section 1311.14. As demonstrated earlier, these three
alternatives are not equally effective and their individual utility will
vary with various circumstancs. The chameleon-like definition of
"obligatory," the difficulty of producing evidence sufficient to estab-
lish that the amounts were actually used in construction, and unfore-
seeable disbursement errors perpetuate uncertainty in this area.
Therefore, it seems safe to predict that the intelligent lender will
adopt a construction mortgage procedure that will encompass as
many characteristics of all three alternatives as is possible.
The Ohio open-end mortgage statute, which was not effective
at the time the Yarborough case arose, should also be considered by
a lender who engages in the business of making construction loans.
Under this statute, a person who makes a non-obligatory loan is
afforded priority over all subsequently filed mortgages unless the
subsequent mortgagee has notified him of the mortgage before the
time he actually makes the advance. However, the utility of this
statute appears limited, due to the fact that most lenders will not
want to be placed in a position where they are subject to subordina-
tion in the event another mortgagee follows the relatively simple
procedure of serving notice upon them.
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